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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Case No. 20150623-CA 
CARL HOLM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
The Honorable Katie Bernards-
Goodman 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Holm submits this reply brief "limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the [State's] opposing brief." Utah R. App. P. 24(c). Thus, Mr. Holm 
does not respond to the State's arguments to the extent that they were adequately 
addressed in the opening brief or do not merit a response. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Abused Its Limited Discretion by Refusing to 
Conduct Individual Voir Dire. 
The State in its brief argues that "the [trial] court asked sufficient questions 
to allow counsel to gain information necessary to evaluate the juror's potential 
bias based on experience with car wrecks." See Aple.Br. 17. Mr. Holm reminds 
the Court of the relevant voir dire proceedings at issue which establish that he 
had no such opportunity. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At no point during voir dire did the trial court inform the venire that the 
allegations involved Mr. Holm causing a serious car accident. 
The trial court asked the venire if anyone or anyone close to them had been 
involved in a serious car accident. R.353, 355. Several jurors Gurors 1, 6, 8-10, 
13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21-26, 28, 31, and 32) answered in the affirmative. R.353-356. 
The trial court then asked whether there was "anything about that experience 
that makes you feel like you might be biased for one side or the other?" R.356. 
Jurors 1, 13, 17, and 26 answered in the affirmative and the trial court spoke with 
each of these jurors individually. R.356, 359, 362-363. 1 
Mr. Holm requested the trial court to call in each juror individually2 who 
indicated they or someone close had been involved in a serious car accident in 
order to find out more details of the accidents. R.358-359, 367. The trial court 
refused Mr. Holm's request, reasoning that the potential jurors had indicated 
they would have no bias. R.359, 367. 
After questioning jurors 1, 13, and 17 individually, the trial court struck for 
cause 1 and 17. R.360-364. The trial court did not question juror 26 because 
there was no possibility juror 26 could be chosen as a juror due to her being near 
the end of the venire. The State discusses in its brief how defense counsel only 
asked juror 13 one question during individual questioning; ultimately, the Court 
did not strike juror 13 for cause even though she originally indicated she may 
have a bias. R.362-363. However, because juror 13 originally indicated she may 
have a bias, defense counsel used his first peremptory challenge to strike juror 13; 
no detailed questions were needed. R.229. 
2 In addition to jurors 1, 13, 17, and 26, these would have included jurors 6, 
8-10, 15, 18, 20, 21-25, 28, 31, and 32. 
2 
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Reasonable and detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
jurors' own experience with serious car accidents - such as the extent of any 
injuries, whether someone ran a red light, the location of the accident, whether 
speed played a factor, whether someone died, their feelings towards an individual 
who causes an accident - was necessary and imperative where it may have 
revealed a bias against someone who caused a car accident. This was particularly 
true because the venire was not able to recognize a bias at this point in the 
proceedings because they knew next to nothing about the case; the jurors did not 
even know that the case involved a car accident, let alone the details of the car 
accident. 
Even if individual voir dire did not reveal a bias, it would certainly have 
given Mr. Holm more information when exercising his right to peremptory 
challenges. Besides a few individual jurors the trial court questioned, Mr. Holm 
knew nothing of the other potential jurors who had experience with serious car 
accidents. 
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Limited Discretion by Allowing 
Introduction of a Disturbing Crime-Scene Photograph of Mr. 
Garcia's Deceased Body. 
Mr. Holm limits this issue on appeal to part three of the test outlined in 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,r 46, 52 P .3d 1210 - whether the trial court erred in 
admitting the photograph at issue pursuant to Rule 403 because the risk of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the photograph. 
3 
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With regard to the probative value, the State argues that the probative 
value of the photograph established an essential element of the charge, namely 
that Mr. Holm caused the death of another. As stated by the State, "[t]hese 
circumstances raise the issue of whether the victim could have been saved, and 
whether the actions of emergency responders were an intervening cause of the 
victim's death." See Aple.Br. 22. 
The evidentiary value of the photograph was extremely weak, especially 
because the main dispute at trial was whether Mr. Holm acted with criminal 
negligence. At no point in the trial (including opening and closing arguments) 
did Mr. Holm dispute that he caused the death of Mr. Garcia, and at no point did 
he in any way suggest that the emergency responders caused Mr. Garcia's death. 
Even if the emergency responders' actions somehow contributed to Mr. Garcia's 
death, Mr. Holm is unaware of any case law to support a defense that this 
excused Mr. Holm's actions in this situation. 
As discussed in Mr. Holm's brief (and not disputed in the State's brief), 
Utah appellate courts have determined that graphic photographs in murder cases 
lack the high degree of evidentiary significance necessary to overcome their 
potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant when they are only offered to prove 
death. See Aplt.Br. 29, citing State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230-31 (Utah 
1989), State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988), State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d 750, 753-54 (Utah 1986). 
4 
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With regard to the risk of unfair prejudice, the photograph - an 8x10 color 
close-up photograph of Mr. Garcia's deceased body sitting pinned in a smashed 
vehicle with wet blood around his gapping mouth with his eyes rolled back -
created a great danger of unfair prejudice. Weighed together, the limited 
probative value of the photograph was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the 
photograph. 
III. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Holm's Request to Define 
"Simple Negligence" for the Jury. 
Mr. Holm's defense was that he was not guilty of negligent homicide 
because he at most acted with an alternative mens rea, i.e. simple negligence, 
than with the mens rea of the statute under which he was charged, i.e., criminal 
negligence. It was particularly important in this case to have both the terms 
"criminal negligence" and "simple negligence" defined for the jury because both 
have similarities but clear distinctions. 
Jury Instruction 243 operated as a universal reference and roadmap of the 
legal definitions of mental states, only one of which - "criminal negligence" - was 
applicable to this case and which did not include a definition of "simple 
negligence." 4 R.211. Although Jury Instruction 24 correctly sets forth the 
3 Jury Instruction 24 is attached as Addendum A. 
4 Mr. Holm originally had no objection to including the definitions of 
"intentional," "knowing," or "reckless" in Jury Instruction 24 because the trial 
court originally had determined to include Mr. Holm's proposed instruction 
5 
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definitions of "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "criminal 
negligence," it did not include a definition of "simple negligence." This created 
potential confusion because in the absence of any lower mental state - i.e., 
simple negligence - being defined, the jury may have mistakenly understood that 
the lowest culpable mental state in criminal law is "criminal negligence." Having 
"simple negligence" defined with the other mental states in Jury Instruction 24 
would clearly have shown the jury the hierarchy of the various mental states and 
supported Mr. Holm's defense that he acted with a less culpable mental state 
than that with which he was charged. 
It was particularly important in this case, the main dispute being did Mr. 
Holm act with "criminal negligence" or "simple negligence,"s to have both terms 
specifically defined. Without having both definitions, the jury may have 
incorrectly assumed that there is only one type of "negligence," i.e. "criminal 
negligence." 
defining "simple negligence." R.698-699. However, the trial court later 
determined to not define "simple negligence" for the jury but to include the 
definitions of "intention," "knowing," and "reckless," despite Mr. Holm's 
objection. R.716-727. 
s In its brief, the State argues that Mr. Holm was not prejudiced from the 
trial court failing to instruct the jury as to the definition of "simple negligence" 
because, according to the State, "[i]f the jury believed [Mr. Holm]'s testimony, 
they would not [have] conclude[ed] that he was even guilty of simple negligence." 
See Aple.Br. 31. Mr. Holm never made this argument and assuming the jury 
believed Mr. Holm's version of events, the jury could certainly have determined 
that he acted with simple negligence but not criminal negligence. 
6 
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Mr. Holm had "a right to have his ... theory of the case presented to the jury 
in a clear and understandable way." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 
1992). Mr. Holm's theory of the case was that he did not act with "criminal 
negligence," but rather with "simple negligence." An instruction defining a term 
is necessary when the term "has a technical legal meaning so different from its 
ordinary meaning that the jury, without further explanation, would 
misunderstand its import in relation to the factual circumstances." State v. 
Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ,r 15,316 P.3d 435 (citation omitted). This 
instruction error prevented Mr. Holm from presenting a complete defense which 
error seriously calls into question the jury's verdict. 
IV. There is Insufficient Evidence that Mr. Holm Committed the 
Crime of Negligent Homicide. 
The State argues that in marshaling the evidence, "the defendant vastly 
undersold the record evidence supporting his conviction for Negligent 
Homicide." See Aple.Br. 33. The State then proceeds to list seven "facts from the 
record to supplement the defense presentation of the marshaled evidence." See 
Aple.Br. 33. 
Mr. Holm more than adequately marshalled the evidence. In Mr. Holm's 
"Statement of Facts," he spends approximately sixteen pages where in every 
sentence he cites to the record of the evidence presented at trial. See Aplt.Br. 4-
20. Although Mr. Holm does not repeat these sixteen pages in his "Insufficiency 
7 
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of Evidence" section, he summarizes the main points. Contrary to the State's 
assertion, he does not "vastly under[sale] the record. See Aple.Br. 33. 
The State lists seven examples of how Mr. Holm "undersold" the record. 
See Aple.Br. 33-35. Below is a citation to Mr. Holm's brief where he discusses 
what the States claims he failed to marshal: 
(1) The State discusses that "Bangerter Highway is a fast moving highway, 
with a speed of 50 mph." See Aple.Br. 33. In his brief, Mr. Holm stated, "[t]he 
posted speed limit between 9000 South and 3400 South is 55 mph and 50 mph 
between 3400 South and the 201-Overpass Intersection." See Aplt.Br. 6, citing 
R.691. 
(2) The State discusses Mike and Brittany Grange's testimonies. See 
Aple.Br. 33. Mr. Holm in his brief discusses the Granges' testimonies in length, 
including that they observed a vehicle weave multiple times, that they tried to get 
the license plate number to call the police because they believed the driver was 
impaired, and that they estimated the other vehicle was traveling anywhere 
between 70-90 mph. See Aplt.Br. 7-11. 
(3) The State discusses the testimony and conclusions of its own expert, 
Detective Darren Mower. See Aple.Br. 34. The State seems to call into question 
its own expert's conclusions related to the speed Mr. Holm was driving at the 
time of the accident. It is true, as discussed in both briefs, that some of the 
8 
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methods6 Detective Mower in some cases uses to give a rate-of-speed estimate 
were inapplicable in this specific accident. See Aplt.Br. 18, citing R.497-500. In 
some cases, Detective Mower is unable to estimate the rate of speed at the point 
of impact of an accident. See Aplt.Br. 18, citing R-497-500. However, he was 
able to give an estimate in this case, an estimate he is "confident" about, given his 
fourteen years of experience and training and despite the fact that witnesses 
estimated that Mr. Holm was traveling much faster. Neither party disputed the 
credentials of Detective Mower at trial nor did either party dispute Detective 
Mower's estimate of the rate of speed Mr. Holm was traveling at the time of the 
accident. Detective Mower's "confident" conclusion was that Mr. Holm was 
traveling 50 mph - the speed limit - at the time of the accident. See Aplt.Br. 17-
18, citing R.501, 537. 
(4) The State discusses how witnesses testified that it was dark outside at 
the time of the crash. See Aple.Br. 35. Mr. Holm does the same in his brief. See 
Aplt.Br. 7 (stating that "[i]t was dark outside with little traffic," citing R.R418-
420, 430); Aplt.Br. 10 (stating that "[i]t was still dark outside at the time of the 
accident," citing R.445); Aplt.Br. 14 (stating that Ms. Daybell "remembers it was 
dark outside" at the time of the accident); Aplt.Br. 16 (stating that Mr. Holm 
discussed how it was dark outside he would have noticed since it was dark 
outside, citing R.650, 651, 656-657, 674). 
6 These methods Detective Mower discussed included the conservation of 
momentum equation, the conservation of energy method, and examining the 
airbag control module. See Aplt.Br. 18, citing R.497-500. 
9 
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(5) The State discusses how Mr. Holm was eight minutes late for work and 
"still had some distance to go before he arrived .... " See Aple. Br. 35. In his brief, 
Mr. Holm discusses how he was expected to be to work at 6:oo am and that the 
first 911 call was placed around 6:07-6:08 am. See Aplt.Br. 16-17, citing R.482, 
596-597. 
(6) The States discusses how Mr. Holm "passed through this same 
intersection to and from work every day for two months prior to the crash." See 
Aple.Br. 35. Similarly in his brief, Mr. Holm discussed how Ms. Holm drove Mr. 
Holm to and from work through the intersection six days a week for two months. 
See Aplt.Br. 5. Mr. Holm reminds the Court that Mr. Holm was the passenger 
and he drove through the intersection as the driver only a few times because 
typically his wife drove him to work. See Aplt.Br. 5, citing R.615-617, 626, 652-
653, 670-672, 676. 
(7) The State discusses how four other witnesses who are familiar with the 
intersection testified that they are not confused with the intersection at issue. See 
Aple.Br. 35. Similarly in his brief, Mr. Holm discussed that multiple other people 
who are familiar with the intersection are not confused with the intersection's 
layout. See Aplt.Br. 19, citing R.401, 414, 436, 458, 616, 621. Although others 
were not confused with the intersection at issue, it was not in dispute that the 
layout of the intersection is unique and different from standard intersections. 
R.685-686. 
10 
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As discussed in Mr. Holm's brief and similar to the Utah Court of Appeals' 
determination in State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,999 P.2d 1252, Mr. Holm 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for negligent homicide 
because the facts do not support the jury's determination that he acted with 
criminal negligence. Like the defendant in Larsen, Mr. Holm's conduct can be 
"more accurately characterized as a serious mistake in judgment." Id. at ,r 21. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Holm asks this Court to reverse his conviction for insufficiency of the 
evidence. Alternatively, Mr. Holm asks this Court to reverse and remand for a 
new trial because (1) the trial court abused its discretion in voir dire when it 
denied Mr. Holm the opportunity to conduct individual voir dire, (2) the trial 
court erred in admitting a disturbing photograph showing Mr. Garcia's dead body 
pinned in the smashed vehicle 
shortly after a fatal car accident, and (3) the trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Holm's request to instruct the jury regarding the definition of"simple 
negligence." 
SUBMITIED this~/ ~tay of July, 2016. 
11 
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JURY INSTRUCTION N0 . .2:L 
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
bis conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result 
A person engages in conduct recklessly with respect to the circumstances SU1TOunding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that is disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint 
A person acts with criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
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